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53 
SELF-DEFEATING MINIMALISM 
Adam B. Cox* † 
Everyone wants a piece of Tom DeLay. The former majority leader is 
under investigation and indictment, and even the Supreme Court threatened 
last Term to undo one of his signal achievements. In 2003, DeLay orches-
trated a highly unusual mid-decade revision of Texas’s congressional map. 
The revised map was a boon to Republicans, shifting the Texas congres-
sional delegation from 15 Republicans and 17 Democrats to 21 Republicans 
and 11 Democrats. The map was attacked as an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander and a violation of the Voting Rights Act. When the Supreme 
Court agreed to hear those challenges in LULAC v. Perry, many commenta-
tors thought the Court’s action signaled that it was finally prepared to strike 
down a redistricting plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander—
something it had never done. 
The case did not turn out to be quite the watershed in partisan gerryman-
dering jurisprudence that some had predicted. The Supreme Court saved a 
piece of DeLay’s legacy by rejecting the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering 
claims. The Court did intervene in a limited way, however, concluding that 
District 23 in the new congressional plan violated Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act by diluting the votes of Latino voters. At the center of the six frac-
tured opinions that produced this outcome was Justice Kennedy, who 
delivered the judgment of the Court and authored its central opinion. 
The early commentary on LULAC and Justice Kennedy’s role has high-
lighted two central points. First, everyone agrees that stasis prevailed in 
partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence; Kennedy continued to sit on the 
fence, and consequently LULAC marks no jurisprudential shift on this front. 
Second, some have been pleasantly surprised by the Voting Rights Act hold-
ing, noting that Justice Kennedy—not always the biggest fan of the Act—cast 
the deciding vote to invalidate the changes to District 23 on vote dilution 
grounds.  
While these two holdings are separately interesting, the more important 
question I want to pursue is what Kennedy’s twin holdings, taken together, 
mean for the future of voting rights jurisprudence. On this score, we might 
initially be inclined to applaud Justice Kennedy. His opinion appears to em-
body a laudably minimalist approach to redistricting jurisprudence. 
Kennedy shied away from a constitutional ruling, instead finding a statutory 
footing for the Court’s intervention: he cobbled together an overlapping 
consensus that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was violated in order to 
invalidate a part of Texas’s troubling mid-decade redistricting plan, without 
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having to take the unprecedented step of striking down a redistricting plan 
as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. 
The problem is that Justice Kennedy’s approach exacerbates an existing 
tension in voting rights jurisprudence in a way that is counterproductive and 
potentially self-defeating. The tension is embodied in Kennedy’s deeply 
inconsistent treatment of the role of legislative primacy in the redistricting 
process. In LULAC, Kennedy noisily touted legislative primacy in his parti-
san gerrymandering discussion while quietly shaping Voting Rights Act 
doctrine in ways that undermine that very primacy. He gives legislatures 
nearly boundless authority to redraw district lines in ways that have a devas-
tating effect on the fortunes of a political party, while placing strict limits on 
the power of legislatures to redistrict in a way that has an effect on minority 
voters—even if the redistricting might, on balance, enhance the power of the 
minority group as a whole. 
Justice Kennedy began his opinion with a celebration of legislative pri-
macy, using his rejection of the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims as 
a vehicle for reaffirming the central role of legislatures in the congressional 
redistricting process. As the font of this primacy Kennedy drew on the Elec-
tions Clause of the Constitution. That clause provides that the “Times, 
Places, and Manner of holding Elections . . . shall be prescribed in each 
State by the Legislature thereof,” reserving to Congress the power to “at any 
time by law make or alter such Regulations.” Echoing Justice Scalia’s inter-
pretation of the clause in previous partisan gerrymandering litigation, 
Kennedy concluded that this language embodies a commitment to legislative 
primacy in election regulation and, as a result, severely circumscribes the 
role that courts can undertake to police the redistricting process. He relied 
on this commitment to reject the plaintiffs’ proposed presumption that un-
necessary mid-decade redistrictings be constitutionally suspect. And more 
generally, the rhetoric of legislative supremacy suffused his rejection of the 
plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims. 
Despite the pervasiveness of Kennedy’s rhetoric about legislative pri-
macy, he applied Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in a way that 
systematically undermines the very primacy he purports to protect. His ap-
proach introduces a surprising path dependency into the redistricting process 
that makes it more difficult for legislatures to alter previously agreed upon 
district lines. To be sure, Justice Kennedy claimed to do just the opposite—
rejecting the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claim on the ground that 
Texas should be free to revise its existing lines whenever it chooses. But the 
status quo bias that he rejected forcefully in the partisan gerrymandering 
context snuck back into the opinion when he evaluated the plaintiffs’ Voting 
Rights Act claims. 
Kennedy undermines legislative primacy in part by adopting a very indi-
vidualistic conception of minority voting rights. One of the central questions 
raised in LULAC was whether Texas violated Section 2 when it dismantled 
the 23rd congressional district. That district previously had a thin majority 
of Latino citizens, but those citizens had never constituted a majority of vot-
ers and the district had previously elected Henry Bonilla, who was not the 
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candidate of choice of the Latino voters. Still, Latinos had come close to 
knocking off Bonilla in the 2002 election. So Texas Republicans used the 
mid-decade remap to shore up Bonilla’s district, removing a substantial 
number of Latino voters. At the same time, however, the Republicans cre-
ated a new District 25 that was majority Latino and that available statistical 
evidence suggested would elect a Latino candidate of choice. 
Kennedy’s individualistic conception of voting rights contributed to his 
conclusion that District 25 could not compensate for the loss of District 23. 
On his conception, the state’s swap involved an impermissible trade-off be-
tween the rights of minority voters. Regardless of the voting power 
conferred on Latino voters in District 25, Latino voters in District 23 had 
been stripped of political power they once wielded. Of course, conceptualiz-
ing the right to vote as an individual entitlement in this fashion undermines 
legislative discretion by building a status quo bias into the system. Once the 
legislature creates a majority-minority district, any attempt to move that 
district elsewhere in the state will look like a deprivation of the rights of 
voters in the initial district. 
Kennedy also undermines legislative primacy through his evidentiary 
approach to the plaintiffs’ Voting Rights Act claims. To conclude that Dis-
trict 25 was not a sufficient substitute for District 23, Kennedy held that 
District 23 was an “opportunity district” under the Voting Rights Act, but 
that District 25 was not. This conclusion was far from obvious. For one 
thing, Latino voters had never actually elected a candidate of their choice in 
District 23. While they had come close to knocking off Bonilla in the previ-
ous election, they had failed. Moreover, the new District 25 contained a 
clear Latino majority, and the available statistical evidence that Latino vot-
ers in District 25 consistently voted as a bloc in favor of Latino candidates 
suggested that District 25 might well provide Latino voters with more power 
than District 23. 
Justice Kennedy rejected as misleading this statistical evidence of Latino 
electoral strength in District 25. He concluded that the district actually con-
tained two distinct groups of Latino voters with divergent interests, which 
would prevent the district from providing the opportunities for both groups 
that Section two required. As a conceptual matter, Kennedy’s focus on the 
way in which statistical measures of voting power might mask important 
fissures among voters in a district is entirely unobjectionable. The problem 
is that Kennedy’s conclusion about the lack of cohesion in District 25 seems 
largely ad hoc. First, he doesn’t seem to identify any other measures that 
better reflect the sort of cohesion he is trying to identify. He hints at the im-
portance of “the enormous geographical distance separating” the two parts 
of District 25, but then makes clear that this spatial separation is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to his conclusion. Second, the evidence of bloc vot-
ing behavior that Justice Kennedy considers irrelevant as a measure of 
cohesion for District 25 is precisely the same evidence that he cites approv-
ingly when he concludes that the now-dismantled District 23 had been 
cohesive. 
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Kennedy’s ad hoc approach and his disparate treatment of the same sort 
of evidence is initially perplexing. On closer examination, however, it ap-
pears to hinge on an implicit status quo bias. Justice Kennedy’s reasoning 
reflects considerable confidence in his ability to read from historical evi-
dence the reality of the present political landscape, and deep distrust in the 
statistical tools used to predict political consequences of alternative district 
arrangements. He clearly thought that the past voting behavior of Latinos in 
the old District 23 was strong evidence that they had forged common politi-
cal ground. But because District 25 had not existed for several election 
cycles as District 23 had, Kennedy refused to conclude that Latino voters in 
that district could forge similar common ground. In other words, the fact 
that voters in old District 23 had already demonstrated cohesion was a 
strong reason for him to prefer this district to a new district in which, hypo-
thetically, Latino voters might develop the same sort of cohesion. 
This approach, which favors existing districts, introduces a status quo 
bias that locks in choices legislatures make about how to comply with the 
Voting Rights Act. Had neither District 23 nor 25 previously existed, it 
seems unlikely that Kennedy would have rejected a legislative decision to 
draw District 25 rather than 23. But once the legislature created District 23 
in a previous plan, Justice Kennedy’s approach sapped the legislature’s dis-
cretion to swap that district for District 25 at a later date. 
In short, Kennedy’s approach creates substantial tension between parti-
san gerrymandering jurisprudence and Voting Rights Act jurisprudence. To 
be sure, there are potential theoretical justifications for preserving legislative 
primacy much more steadfastly in the former area than the latter. The legal 
claims are technically quite different: one is constitutional, the other statu-
tory; one about politics, the other about race. We might conclude, for 
example, that it makes good sense to build a status quo bias into Voting 
Rights Act jurisprudence. Interpreting the Act to prefer existing districts to 
new ones would help insulate minority voters from the obligation of form-
ing new political coalitions. And protecting the already-established 
coalitions of minority voters might make it easier for those voters to consis-
tently exert political power. Of course, it might not. Voting rights theorists 
often disagree about whether minority voters are better served in the long 
run by rules that insulate them from political competition, or instead by 
rules that force them to develop the organizational techniques necessary for 
ordinary politics. Still, it is possible to construct a theoretical defense of 
Kennedy’s approach—albeit not one advanced by the Justice himself.  
The difficulty with Kennedy’s opinion is that—as the LULAC litigation 
itself reveals—it is nearly impossible to enforce such a strong distinction 
between partisan gerrymandering and Voting Rights Act claims. Race is of-
ten strongly correlated with partisanship in America. Accordingly, 
redistricters know that the most effective way to accomplish partisan ends is 
often to manipulate the distribution of minority voters among districts. This 
political reality makes any effort to enforce a hard doctrinal wall between 
partisan gerrymandering and racial vote dilution claims unlikely to succeed. 
Such doctrinal walls create incentives for parties to re-cast their claims in 
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whatever doctrinal form seems most likely to succeed. In LULAC, this may 
have led the litigants to emphasize the racial dimensions of their claims. 
And, of course, this temptation can also afflict judges, creating the risk that 
they will use minority vote dilution doctrine to intervene in cases where they 
are disturbed by the partisan undercurrents of a redistricting plan. 
The possibility of strategic behavior by litigants and judges threatens to 
make self-defeating Kennedy’s attempt to preserve legislative primacy with 
respect to partisan gerrymandering claims. And to the extent that his ap-
proach still cuts into legislative discretion, it may do so in a counter-
productive fashion. Certain kinds of path dependency can be beneficial in 
the redistricting process. As I have argued elsewhere, forcing legislators to 
stick with their redistricting choices for some time can improve the redis-
tricting process, creating a partial temporal veil of ignorance that curbs 
egregious gerrymanders and improves the motives of legislators engaged in 
redistricting. But the limited, district-specific path dependency imposed by 
Justice Kennedy’s reading of the Voting Rights Act is unlikely to bring any 
of these benefits. In the end, the superficial attractiveness of Kennedy’s ap-
proach masks a deep incoherence that threatens to further undermine voting 
rights jurisprudence. 
